Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2005

Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-Ups
Ronald J. Mann
Columbia Law School, rmann@law.columbia.edu

Thomas W. Sager
Tom.Sager@mccombs.utexas.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the
Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-Ups, RESEARCH POLICY,
VOL. 36, P. 193, 2007; U OF TEXAS LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 57 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1380

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
SCHOOL OF LAW
Research Policy 36 (2007)
Law and Economics Research Paper No. 57

Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-ups
Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager
The University of Texas School of Law
All of the papers in this series can be downloaded from:
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/clbe/papers.html

This article was originally published in a journal published by
Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the
author’s benefit and for the benefit of the author’s institution, for
non-commercial research and educational use including without
limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific
colleagues that you know, and providing a copy to your institution’s
administrator.
All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without
limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access,
or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution’s
website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission
may be sought for such use through Elsevier’s permissions site at:
http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissionusematerial

Research Policy 36 (2007) 193–208

Ronald J. Mann a,∗ , Thomas W. Sager b

University of Texas School of Law, Center for Law, Business & Economics, 727 E. Dean Keeton Street, Austin, TX 78705, United States
b McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, United States

co

a

py

Patents, venture capital, and software start-ups

Received 23 April 2006; received in revised form 5 September 2006; accepted 18 October 2006
Available online 14 December 2006

al

Abstract

rs

on

This paper analyzes the relation between the patenting behavior of startup firms and the progress of those firms through the
venture capital cycle. Linking data relating to venture capital financing of software startup firms with data concerning the patents
obtained by those firms, we find significant and robust positive correlations between patenting and several variables measuring the
firm’s performance (including number of rounds, total investment, exit status, receipt of late stage financing, and longevity). The
data also show that (1) only about one in four venture-backed software firms acquired even one patent during the period of the study;
(2) patenting practices very considerably among the sub-sectors of the software industry; and (3) the relationship between patent
metrics and firm performance depends less on the size of the patent portfolio than on the firm’s receipt of at least one patent.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Throughout their relatively short histories, the
software and venture capital industries have been
intertwined. Formed in the mid-1960s, the software
industry grew rapidly throughout the 1970s, and by the
1980s the United States had a large and well-developed
software industry with more than one thousand firms.1
Software firms enter and exit the industry with great
frequency, and, evidenced by the size and frequency of
investments, the venture capital model seems to work
quite well for these firms.
The modern venture capital industry started modestly
shortly after World War II. As recounted in Gompers
and Lerner (2001), the industry struggled through a
series of boom-and-bust cycles until the end of the
∗
1
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1970s. However, since about 1980, the modern model
of syndicated limited partnerships investing funds
largely derived from pension portfolios has transformed
early-stage finance by increasing the availability of
capital to young and risky firms. The potential for high
growth rates and high operating margins attracts venture
capitalists to firms touting highly innovative products,
despite the absence of physical assets or operating histories necessary to obtain investment through traditional
sources. Thus, the availability of venture capital likely
has contributed both to the rapid pace of innovation and
to the fragmented structure of the software industry.
As these industries have matured, the intellectual
property protections available for software have shifted
as well. From the mid-1960s when the Copyright Office
formally decided to permit registration of computer
programs through the late 1980s, copyright provided
relatively strong protection for software. Early the
next decade, a series of appellate decisions narrowed
the scope of copyright for broader structural features
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organization literature is that property rights facilitate
an industrial structure in which relatively small firms
develop pieces of products assembled by larger firms
(Arora and Merges, 2004; Gans et al., 2002).
Mann (2005a) reports qualitative empirical work
(a series of interviews of venture capitalists, lenders,
and executives at software startups and large software
firms) suggesting that patents have a variety of potential
positive effects, depending on the stage of firm’s development. For firms in the pre-revenue stage, patents have
little or no value; investors at this stage generally pointed
to product market experience and management acumen
as being more pertinent to initial investment decisions.
For revenue-generating startups, patents seem to have
positive value (in limited sectors). Investors commonly
referred to the need to identify firms that will have sufficient market power to earn profits. Investors in those
firms regard patent protection as a tool that might provide sustainable differentiation. Patents have ambiguous
value for larger firms in that they facilitate cross licensing
so that large firms can maintain a competitive equilibrium with other large established firms.
In this paper, we turn to a quantitative analysis of the
first two stages of that framework: the role of patents
for pre-revenue and later-stage startups. Specifically, by
analyzing patent and financing data for a group of software startups, we can learn more about the significance
of patents for those firms. Although many features of
the data are ambiguous and suggest avenues for further inquiry, they do suggest that patents play a role of
some importance in the development of firms seeking
to enter the software industry, albeit one that depends
substantially on the type of firm.
Specifically, the data suggest that:

2
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of computer programs. However, major firms in the
industry by that time had already begun turning to patent
protection. Then, beginning in the 1980s and coming
to fruition by the mid-1990s, judicial opinions and
administrative actions began to adopt a more expansive
approach to the breadth and strength of software patents.
As of late, patents have become particularly controversial in the software industry. The recent spread of
patents and the cost and frequency of litigation have
raised concerns, not only in the United States, but also
in the European Union and Japan. This article bypasses
many of the important public policy questions that those
controversies entail, and instead focuses on the question
whether patents are valuable to the firms that have them.
If patents do not have a positive value for the firms that
acquire them, then it is unlikely that the net effects of the
patent system are positive. This question is surprisingly
difficult to answer.
Patents might have private value to firms if they help
firms attract financing or if they allow firms to exploit
the value of internal research and development investments. There has been a good deal of empirical work,
predominantly dealing with relatively large companies,
examining the relation between patent counts and R&D.2
Similarly, we have some empirical information about the
role of patents in the software industry in particular. The
most detailed published study of the industry is Graham
and Mowery’s 2003 book chapter. Their work compares
patent grants in certain IPC classes with R&D expenditures for large packaged-software firms. They conclude
that the propensity to patent (measured in patents per
$100M R&D dollars) rose by about 50% (from about
2.0 to 3.0) from 1988 to 1996.
Those contributions aside, the literature addressing
the role of patents in small firms or in small software
firms is underdeveloped, primarily due to the paucity
of data. There are, however, good reasons to consider
the role of patenting in software startups. The lack of
concentration in the industry, for one thing, suggests that
smaller firms play a significant role. Moreover, some
data suggest that small firms in our economy contribute
disproportionately to R&D investment and innovative
activity.3 One possible explanation from the industrial
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For e.g. Blundell et al. (1999), Cincera (1997), Crepon and Duguet
(1997a,b), Montalvo (1997).
3 NSF statistics suggest that small firms contribute about 20% of
all private R&D funding. NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators
2006, available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c4/c4s1.htm.
Audretsch (1995) illustrates that small firms have a disproportionate
share of innovative activity given their level of formal R&D expenditures.

• Patent acquisition (or application) at the time of initial
investment is largely irrelevant to the firm’s subsequent progress through the venture capital cycle,
measured by any metric.
• Patent acquisition is significantly correlated with any
of several variables that are indicators of the firm’s
progress through the venture capital cycle (including
number of rounds, total investment, and longevity).
• The rates of patenting differ substantially from sector to sector within the industry, indicating that even
among software firms there are differences in the use
of patents.
Section 2 of the paper explains the data and the methods that we use to analyze it. Section 3 presents the
empirical findings. Section 4 analyzes the implications
of the empirical findings. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.
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2.1. Selecting the ﬁrms
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This paper responds to the gap in the literature discussed above, by analyzing the relation between the
patenting practices of software firms and their acquisition of venture financing and progress through the
venture capital cycle. Given the relative lack of data
on private firms and in an effort to test the hypotheses
developed in Mann (2005a), we decided that a study of
venture-backed software firms – for which there is at
least some data – would be a good proxy for a study of
new entrants in the industry. This limitation seems reasonable considering that most software firms that have
risen to prominence in recent years have relied on venture capital financing at some point in their development
cycle.4 (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Cusumano, 2004).
The paper considers two different types of information about venture-backed software firms: information
about their operations and information about their
patents. This section of the paper discusses the methods of collecting data for that analysis. It proceeds in
three steps: the selection of firms, the collection of performance data, and the collection of patenting data.
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Our investment data were obtained from the VentureXpert database. VentureXpert is a proprietary database
of Venture Economics, which is a division of Thomson
Financial. Venture Economics receives quarterly reports
on portfolio holdings from more than 1000 venture
capital organizations and major institutional investors.
The information includes several data points about the
portfolio companies, including, among other things, a
designation of the type of investment, name and location
of the portfolio firm, date and amount of investment and
the industry in which the firm competes.
We restricted the search to “venture-related” deals,
which is defined as firms that received at least one venture
stage investment from any kind of firm or one nonventure stage investment from a firm that traditionally
focuses on venture capital. We also limited the search to
United States investments. Because we wanted to analyze firms of similar ages and sizes, we restricted our
search to firms that had received their first round of
venture financing within a relatively narrow window of
time.5
4

We also wanted to select a time recent enough that
the experience of the firms and their patenting would
be representative of current conditions in the industry. Because the legal significance of software patents
changed during the early part of the 1990s, it was important to select a period that began some time well after
1995. At the same time, to allow sufficient time since
first financing to have a fair sense of the outcome of the
investments, it was important that the period not be too
recent. Venture capital funds generally receive little or
nothing on their investments until some cognizable liquidation event – bankruptcy, merger, IPO, or the like –
that disposes of their investment at a single point several
years after the investment. Because the value placed on
the firm at that time is the main indicator of a successful
investment—rather than cash flow during the intervening years (which is likely to be minimal or non-existent),
a somewhat longer focus is appropriate. Thus, if we had
selected a dataset of firms that received their initial funding after the market crash of 2001, too little time would
have passed to provide any fair assessment of the results
of the investments. We recognize that this means that
our firms are situated within what might reasonably be
called a “bubble” of investment practices that preceded
the crash. But as we write it remains too soon to analyze the outcome of a substantial group of post-“bubble”
investments.
Accordingly, we restricted the analysis to firms that
received their first round of venture financing during
1997, 1998, or 1999. To limit the dataset to firms that
actually were startups at that time, we included only firms
whose first round was identified as seed, startup, early
stage, first stage or other early (excluding firms whose
first venture round was a late stage or expansion round,
or an acquisition or debt round).
We defined the software industry broadly to include
firms listed in the VentureXpert database (in the range
2700–2799) as well as firms listed in the Moneytree
database (VEIC 1563, 2900, 2910, 2911, and 2990).
The Venture Capital Yearbook reconciles the conflicting definitions of software firms. For purposes of this
study, we have adopted the broadest definition, including all sectors that would be included in the industry
under either the Moneytree definition or the VentureXpert definition. The selection criteria result in a dataset
of 3,147 financing rounds in 877 firms.
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2. Data
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Prominent venture-backed companies include Intel, Microsoft,
eBay and Google.
5 If we extended the period during which the firms received funding, we could learn more about how the relationships we examine

might have changed over time. But at the same time we would lose
the analytical benefits of a dataset in which all of the firms began their
life at substantially the same time. For the same reason, we have not
performed year fixed effect regressions—the period over which we
collected data is so short as to make that analysis seem superfluous.
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2.2. Finance data
Our strategy was to determine whether we could find
or reject a relation between patents, on the one hand,
and some dependent variable indicative of the investment
decision or the success of the investment. As suggested
above, the underlying theory was that patents are related
in some way to the decision to invest or to the ability
of the firm to attract investment. We cannot of course
obtain information on firms that never received venture financing, so we are not directly examining the
question whether patents are important to the initial
investment decision, a question as to which investors
seem to have conflicting perspectives (Mann, 2005a).
Rather, we are examining the question whether patents
relate to subsequent investment decisions. Within the
analytical framework developed in the prior work, that is
an important distinction: the reasoning of Mann (2005a)
suggests that patents should play at best an inconsistent
role in the initial investment decision, but that their role
should become increasingly important as firms advance
through the venture financing cycle.
To investigate that problem, we collected several different pieces of information from VentureXpert. First, we
collected details about the investment decisions, including the total amount of financing obtained by the firm,
the dates of the financing rounds, and a designation of
the stage of each financing round (starting with seed and
startup, and ranging through other early stage, expansion, later stage, bridge financing, and open market
financing). Second, we collected information about the
performance of the investment, including a designation

of the firm’s status as defunct, acquired, existing, or public, as of January 2005. For public firms, we added the
IPO date. For acquired firms, we included information
on acquisition date and the value of the deal (if disclosed). Finally, to investigate the possibility that the role
of patents might differ even within the software industry, we collected information about the state in which
the company was located as well as a four-digit VentureXpert code designating the primary sector within the
software industry in which each firm competed.
As it happens, the existing literature makes it clear that
the VentureXpert database is incomplete (Kaplan et al.,
2002). Both the VentureXpert and the competing VentureOne databases depend on voluntary contributions of
information from venture capitalists. Their research suggests that both datasets have significant omissions. They
do not suggest, however, any obvious reason to think that
the omissions would lead to a selection bias relevant to
our work. Cognizant of that problem, we collected from
the VentureSource database parallel information about a
similar set of firms. Specifically, we counted the number
of rounds of financing that each of the firms obtained
in the VentureSource database, and recorded the total
investment in the firm and the status of the business as
shown in the VentureSource database in August of 2003.
Because that database is less complete and confirms the
results from the VentureXpert analysis, we do not report
that analysis here.

py

For comparative purposes, we collected a parallel
group of firms in the biotechnology industry (specifically, firms in the VEIC 4000 and 5500 series) that
received their first round of venture financing during
the same years. We selected biotechnology because it
is both a sector of significant interest in the IP literature and because it is one of the largest sectors (other
than software) of venture capital investment. That dataset
includes 772 financing rounds in 212 firms. We report
comparative results for those firms at relevant points
in the paper below. As the literature would predict,6
the results suggest that patents play a different role for
biotech startups than they do for software startups.

6

The existing literature centers on a debate over whether so many
patents are issued as to create an “anticommons” that impedes startup
formation. Compare Heller and Eisenberg (1998) (arguing that there
is an anticommons) with Walsh et al. (2003) (arguing that there is not).

2.3. Patent data
Using Delphion, we collected information about the
patents assigned to each firm in the dataset. For each firm,
we collected the total number of patents, the date of the
first patent application, and the date on which each patent
was granted. The searches were run in January 2005,
and were restricted to patents issued as of 31 December
2004. We used the company names and any alternate
or former names shown in VentureXpert. This search
methodology is underinclusive, because smaller firms
tend to change names frequently. In addition, some firms
receive patents by assignment. Where the firm names
shown in Delphion and VentureXpert were similar but
not identical, we made judgments based on city/state
designations and technology area.
For a number of reasons, we primarily analyze data
about issued patents rather than patent applications.
Although we have collected all published patent applications for our study period, those data necessarily are
incomplete. For much of the period governed by this
dataset, there was no requirement that U.S. patent applications be published. Even for the period during which

co

Fig. 1. Number of patents per firm. For clarity of presentation, the
figure omits the 663 firms (76% of the total) that had no patents.
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23% (49/212) of the parallel biotech firms had obtained
a patent before their first financing and more than half
(56% or 119 of 212) had obtained patents by the end of
the study period. The biotech percentage probably understates the reliance of those firms on patented IP, because
biotech startups are more likely to rely on in-licensed
patented technology from universities.
The 877 software firms have a combined 624 patents,
for an average of 0.71 patents per firm. Among the firms
that had patents, there was an average of 2.92 patents
per firm. Fig. 1 illustrates the distribution by number of
patents among the firms in the dataset that had patents.
The characteristics of the patents are diverse. International Patent Class (IPC) G06F [Electric Digital Data
Processing] accounts for 384 (or 56%) of the patents in
the dataset.8 Table 1 shows the distribution of IPCs to
patents in the dataset. No U.S. patent class accounted
for more than 12% of the patents in the dataset.
The patents have an average of 27 claims; the average number of domestic references is just over 22 per
patent, with this number steadily increasing over time
from about 18 in 1999 to over 28 by 2003. Finally, the
number of times that subsequent patents cite the patent in
question (referred to as forward citations) as of January
2005 is just over five per patent.9
For comparative purposes, in the parallel biotechnology database, the 212 firms had 1161 patents, for an
average of 5.48 patents per firm. Among the firms that
had patents, there was an average of 9.76 patents per
firm. Thus, the biotechnology industry not only has more

rs

publication has become the norm, firms have the option
to keep the application from being published, and it
appears that many software firms (particularly smaller
ones) routinely take advantage of that option. Thus, if
we wished to study applications we could study at most
a truncated set of applications matched to the patents that
ultimately were issued.7
Moreover, except for a series of regressions based on
whether firms had applications or patents before their
first financing, all of our patenting variables examine
a firm’s patent portfolio as of the close of our data
collection. Because our data is so highly skewed, and
because we found no significance to the existence of prefinancing patents, it seemed unlikely to produce valuable
information to examine further details about the time at
which the patents were obtained.
Finally, although we collected citation data, we
have not conducted any statistical analysis of how
citation-weighted patents relate to the investment and
performance metrics. Because the patenting practices of
the firms are so highly skewed, and because the firms
and their patents are so young – most of the patents are
less than 2 years old – we are the skeptical of the value
of such analysis.

197
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The purpose of the research is to examine the relation between patenting and venture capital investment
and performance data. The data shed light on a number
of related questions not previously examined in the literature. Accordingly, before we turn to that point, we
provide descriptive information about patenting rates
and differences in patenting by location and sector.
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3.1. Patent rates and characteristics
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The most surprising finding is that, despite policy
debates about the pervasive impact of software patenting,
most venture-backed software firms did not acquire any
patents during the period of the study. About nine percent
of the firms (75/877) had obtained a patent before their
first financing. The number of firms with patents grew
to about 24% (214/877) by 1 January 2005, between 5
and 8 years after the firms received their first rounds
of venture financing. For comparative purposes, about

8

7 We supplemented the applications data to include all of the applications filed through 2004 that had been published as of August 2006.
Using that data, we ran a series of regressions designed to test whether
there was any significance to filing an application before first financing.
Those regressions were inconclusive.

Compare Graham and Mowery (2003), which reports the IPCs of
patents assigned to the largest firms in the software industry.
9 We do not analyze the patents based on the number of references,
citations, or claims, because the data is so highly skewed. One of us is
undertaking that type of analysis in a related paper with a much larger
dataset of software patents issued to a larger group of firms over a
longer period.
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Table 1
International patent class
Type of invention

Number of patents

G06F
A61B
H04L
G06K
G06T
H04B
G01S
H04M
H04N
G09G
G10L
H04Q
Other

Electrical digital data processing
Medical diagnosis
Transmission of digital information
Recognition and presentation of data
Image data processing
Transmission of electronic communication
Radio direction-finding
Telephonic communication
Pictorial communication
Control of indicating devices to present information
Speech recognition
Communication switches
{33 other classes}

371
24
23
23
20
15
14
13
12
9
9
9
82

Total

–
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100

able, broken up into a number of 0–1 indicator variables
for the domiciliary states of the firms.
To test the effect of location on number of patents, we
used analysis of variance. To test the effect of location
on the existence of patents and multiple patent indicators, we used a χ2 -test for independence. Table 2 shows
the results. In general, there is no correlation between
location and any of the patent variables.
For comparative purposes (and to test whether we
should place any weight on the lack of correlation), we
conducted a similar analysis of the biotech firms. The
biotech data, by contrast, suggest that location has considerable significance, at least in relation to the first three
patent variables identified above. One possible explanation is the connection between patenting and university
affiliations in the biotech industry, so that location is relevant to patenting practices (Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006).
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We analyzed information about the state in which the
firms were located and the specific sector of the industry
to see whether those variables correlated with the existence or number of patents. Generally, the data indicate
no correlation with location, but a significant correlation related to industry sub-sector. The latter finding is
consistent with the premise (discussed in Mann, 2005a)
that firms in different sub-sectors of the software industry have different abilities to appropriate the value of an
invention with a patent.

Au

3.2.1. Location
We tested the role of location by looking for possible
relations between the state in which the firm is located
and several alternative dependent patenting variables: the
number of patents, the existence of patents, the existence
of multiple patents, and the issuance of patents before the
first round.10 The latter three are categorical dependent
variables coded 1 (yes) and 0 (no); the number of patents
is numeric. Location is a categorical independent vari10

59.5
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.2
2.4
2.2
2.1
1.9
1.4
1.4
1.4
13.1

on

3.2. The effect of location and industry group

% of all patents

rs

patents but also has a significantly larger share of firms
with larger patent portfolios. For example, only 2% of
software firms had more than 4 patents, and less than
1% of software firms had more than 10 patents; 19% of
biotechnology firms had more than 4 patents and 6% had
more than 10 patents.

py
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We also ran parallel analyses on patent applications filed before
first financing. That information is less reliable because applications
often do not become public unless they result in an issued patent. In
any event, the results are similar to the analyses that we report patents
issued before first financing.

3.2.2. Industry group
We also tested the possibility that patenting practices
might differ among the sub-sectors of the industry. For
Table 2
Location and patenting
Dependent variable

P-Value

Software
Total patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents/not (0–1)
Patent before round 1 (0–1)

0.437
0.186
0.286
0.128

Biotech
Total patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents/not (0–1)
Patent before round 1 (0–1)

0.0179
<0.001
<0.0001
0.707

R.J. Mann, T.W. Sager / Research Policy 36 (2007) 193–208
Table 3
Industry group and patenting
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Table 4
Cross-tabulation of performance data for firms with and without patents

Biotech
Total patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents/not (0–1)
Patent before round 1 (0–1)

0.86
0.95
0.89
0.076

4 (4.126)
2.100

3 (3.415)
2.028

Total investment
S.D.

$26M ($36M)
$34M

$15M ($25M)
$30M

Exit status
Defunct/liquidated
Existing
Acquired
Public/merger

4%
54%
30%
13%

Late-stage financing

27%

37%

2052 (1938)
734

1971 (1759)
840

214

663

Longevity (days)
S.D.
N

8%
63%
26%
3%

For financing rounds, total investment, and longevity, the table reports
median values with means in parentheses.

statistical analysis that we report below can distinguish
between the possibility that patents facilitate progress
through the investment cycle and the possibility that
progress through the investment cycle facilitates the
firm’s ability to acquire patents. We attempted to resolve
this problem with simultaneous equations, but were
unable to obtain any definitive results, largely because
we have no truly exogenous information for these small
private firms.
Our research hypotheses suggest an ambiguous link
between patenting and investment progress. On the one
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this purpose, we grouped the firms by three-digit codes
from the VentureXpert data, putting small groups in an
“other” category. Again, we used indicators of patenting
intensity as the dependent variable. As Table 3 displays, those results suggest a substantial relation between
industry group and the metrics of patenting that we examine. The absence of such a relation in the biotech industry
suggests that the biotech industry is for this purpose more
homogenous than the software industry.
Those results suggest a number of things relevant to
the role of patenting in the industry, the most obvious
of which is that the appropriability of innovation
through patenting is likely to differ markedly based
upon the type of software development in which the
firm is engaging. To explore the precise nature of the
relationship, we interacted the patenting variables with
the various industry group variables, but none of those
regressions indicated any significant relationships and
we do not report them here.

Financing rounds
S.D.

py

0.015
0.012
0.014
0.032

Firms without patents

co

Software
Total patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents/not (0–1)
Patent before round 1 (0–1)

Firms with patents

al

P-Value
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Dependent variable
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3.3. The relation between patenting and ﬁrm
performance
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The more difficult part of our inquiry is to consider the
relation between patenting and various investment and
performance metrics. We selected five separate metrics:
the number of rounds of financing that the firm obtained,
the total amount of financing that the firm obtained, the
status of the firm as of 1 January 2005, whether the
firm attained a late financing stage; and the longevity
of the firm. The subsequent sections provide detailed
analyses of the relations between those variables and
patenting practices, but Tables 4 and 5 provide simple
cross-tabulations for both industries, showing each of
those metrics for firms with and without patents.
A more challenging problem is the difficulty of
disentangling the possible causal relations among our
variables. Neither the simple cross-tabulations nor the

Table 5
Cross-tabulation of performance data for biotech firms with and without patents
Firms with patents

Firms without patents

Financing rounds
S.D.

4 (4.336)
2.096

2 (2.753)
2.083

Total investment
S.D.

$32M ($40M)
$37.85M

$5M ($25M)
$66.33M

Exit status
Defunct
Existing
Acquired
Merger/public

7%
57%
14%
22%

6%
75%
13%
5%

Late-stage financing

30%

13%

Longevity (days)
S.D.

2294 (2073)
755

2295 (2043)
812

N

119

93

For financing rounds, total investment, and longevity, the table reports
median values with means in parentheses.
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Fig. 2. Rounds of financing.
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3.3.1. Rounds of ﬁnancing
Both VentureXpert and VentureOne include data
about financing rounds. Because the structure of venture capital financing gives venture capitalists a realistic
opportunity to terminate firms after each round, and
makes each additional round a substantial indicator of
progress, the number of rounds is a good proxy for performance (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). We do not have a
dataset of firms that failed to obtain even one round; thus,
we necessarily are testing the total number of rounds
among firms that obtained at least one round.
Unfortunately, it is clear that the data on financing
rounds are incomplete, in the sense that the two datasets
include information about different financing rounds.11
VentureOne representatives suggested that a portion of
the difference might be attributable to different protocols for what constitutes a financing round. Specifically,
VentureXpert might report as separate financing rounds
a series of closely connected disbursements that VentureOne might treat as separate tranches of a single round.
That explanation is not consistent with the data we collected, which in fact indicate a slightly higher number
of financing rounds in the VentureOne database than in
the VentureXpert database (3.3 per firm versus 3.1 per
firm, comparing for the matching periods). In any event,
it is clear that the discrepancies are much more pervasive
(as shown by examination of the dates and stages of the
particular rounds). Thus, it is clear that both databases
fail to include a substantial number of financing rounds.
Nevertheless, because the databases produced similar
results, we are less concerned that a selection bias might
undermine our results.12
We start with some descriptive information about
VentureXpert’s data on financing. More than 80% of the
firms received a second round. The number of rounds
ranged from one to fourteen; Fig. 2 illustrates the distri-

Au

th
o

r's

pe

rs

hand, venture financing contributes to the ability of
startup firms to apply for patents in several ways; the
venture capitalist facilitates patenting both by providing
funds and by providing management expertise to assist
the portfolio firm in the development process. On the
other hand, the interviews reported in Mann (2005a)
suggest that patents (or the prospect of patents) often
can be useful in obtaining funding. Most obviously,
patents can solve one of the most difficult problems for a
startup: convincing the venture capitalist that the startup
can sustainably differentiate itself from its competitors.
Similarly, as the firm advances through the venture capital cycle, patents often are useful to protect the firm
against larger incumbent firms that might try to drive
the startup from the market. Many investors also value
patents because of information they convey about the
operational competence of the firm’s management. On
rare occasions, patents might generate licensing revenues, but that is quite uncommon for software startups
and rarely, if ever, the ex ante aim of a venture capital
investment.
A related issue is the likelihood that the factors that
cause or permit a firm to obtain a patent (e.g., organizational competence, valuable technology, etc.) will be
closely related to the factors that allow it to succeed.
For example, the patent serves as a proxy for both the
innovation and the legal protection. We cannot untangle
whether the patent or the technology that it covers best
explains the results that we report. In the absence of a
natural experiment to compare firms that do or do not
obtain patent protection upon identical technologies, it
is difficult to resolve those problems definitively. Our
hypothesis, based on the interviews in Mann (2005a),
is that technology explains a great deal of the variation
in the outcome of venture capital investments but that
patents (and other IP, broadly defined) play a role of
considerable importance.
Subject to those caveats, our findings suggest that
the factors that make it possible for firms to obtain
patents and motivate them to obtain patents relate to
the factors that allow venture-backed software firms to
progress through the venture capital cycle. The results
are stable across a variety of performance metrics. We
emphasize that the results we report below have a low
explanatory power. That does not surprise us, however,
given the numerous reasons (detailed in Mann, 2005a)
that venture-backed firms might perform well or poorly
that have nothing to do with patents. It is important to
take account of the low explanatory power in trying to
understand what the data suggest about the real world
of investment decision making and venture-backed firm
performance.
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11 Kaplan et al. (2002) provides empirical evidence of the differences
between the two competing datasets.
12 We examined the relation between patenting and financing rounds
using both the VentureXpert and VentureOne databases. Because they
are similar to the VentureXpert results, we do not report the VentureOne
results here in detail.
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Table 6
Patenting and rounds of financing
Independent variable

P-value (regr.)

Expl. power (regr.) (%)

Coeff. (rounds/unit)

Number of patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0008
0.76

1.89
2.19
1.28
0.0102

0.144
0.71
0.69
n/a

py

The dependent variable is the number of rounds of financing.
Table 7
Patenting and total investment
P-Value (regr.)

Expl. power (regr.) (%)

Coeff. ($M/unit)

Number of patents (0–1)
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.2276

2.95
2.10
1.95
1.166

2.745
10.7
13.1
n/a

co

Independent variable

on

patents receive about $10.7M more in total investment
than those without.

3.3.3. Exit status of the ﬁrm
Another indicator of firm performance is the ability
of the firm to exit the venture capital cycle successfully.
Thus, a firm that has failed between the time of its first
financing and the data collection for this project can be
treated as a less successful investment than a firm that
continues to operate at this time. This is a difficult metric because it is harder to quantify “success” than it is
to quantify the amount of financing. For purposes of
analysis, we aggregated the VentureXpert data into four
categories: defunct (including liquidated and bankrupt
firms), existing, acquired, and public (including mergers
and those in registration). As Fig. 3 shows, more than half
of the firms remained in private hands and thus had not
exited, 10% of the firms had been acquired, 5% had gone
public, and only 7% are shown as having failed. Interestingly enough, about three times the share of biotech
firms had gone public (15%) as software firms (5%).
The analysis of exit status (summarized in Table 8)
parallels the prior analyses. Again, the analysis suggests
significant relations between exit status and all of the
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bution of financing rounds in detail. The firms in the
dataset had an average of 11 different investors and
received a total of $24 billion (or an average of $27.5
million per firm).
Table 6 reports the statistical analysis. As it shows, the
data indicate a relationship between number of financing
rounds and number of patents significant at the 1% level,
for the other postfinancing variables at beyond the 0.01%
level, but no significant relation for the prefinancing metric. To get a sense of the significance of the relationship,
the coefficients suggest that each additional patent relates
to 0.144 rounds, and that having at least one patent relates
to 0.71 additional rounds. Parallel analysis of the biotech
data (not reported here) indicated relationships of similar significance. Parallel analysis of the VentureOne data
(not reported here) indicated a relationship significant
at the 5% level for the patents/no patents variable, but
no significant relationship for the number of patents or
multiple patents metrics.

al

The dependent variable is the total investment in the firm.

Au

3.3.2. Total amount of ﬁnancing
The second performance variable is the total amount
of financing that the firm eventually obtains. This variable is somewhat different in its meaning from number of
rounds of financing, because the total amount of investments probably relates more directly to the firm’s overall
performance, where the number of rounds might have a
closer relation to the success of the venture capitalist’s
investment in the firm. Still, as Table 7 indicates, the
results are similar to the results reported above for number of rounds. The coefficients suggest that an increase
of one in the total number of patents is related with an
increase of $2.7M in total investment, so that firms with

Fig. 3. Exit status.
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Table 8
Patenting and exit status
P-Value

Total patents
Patents/not (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before
round 1 (0–1)

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.016*

Explanatory
power (%)

Patenting variable

3.75
3.84
3.11
1.18

Total patents
Patents/not (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before
round 1 (0–1)

The analysis is a MANOVA, for the dependent variable, exit status, is
a multi-valued categorical variable. In effect, the MANOVA converts
exit status into a series of 0–1 indicator variables – one for each type
of exit status – and then finds the linear combination of the indicators
that correlates best with the independent variable. The regression of
that linear combination on the independent variable yields the P-value
and explanatory power reported above.

<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0009
0.26

Explanatory
power (%)
2.40
2.70
1.63
0.32

As in Table 8, the analysis is a MANOVA, for the dependent variable,
late-stage financing, is a multi-valued categorical variable.
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the relation between that data and the various patenting
metrics. We also used an adjusted metric, which removed
treatment of “bridge” financing as late-stage financing.
That metric relied on our view that bridge financing
should not count as evidence of a firm’s success. In
each case, we perform a MANOVA, supplemented with
a χ2 -test for independence (not shown). Both metrics
produced similar results, indicating significant relations
between the latest stage of financing obtained and the
post-financing patenting variables. Table 9 summarizes
the results for the adjusted metric. In this case, the
analysis suggests that the significance comes from the
early-stage category: the effects of patents are plainest in
differentiating between firms that move on to the expansion stage and those that do not. This provides some
support for the hypothesis that the value of patents for
software startups first becomes significant as they reach
the stage at which they begin to generate revenues.

rs

post-financing patent variables. The biotech data (not
reported here) indicate similar relations. Perhaps the
most interesting finding not evident from the table is that
in both industries most of the significance for the postfinancing patenting variables comes from differences in
the share of firms with patents that went public compared
to the share of firms without patents that went public.

P-Value

py

Patenting variable

Table 9
Patenting and late-stage financing
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3.3.4. Late-stage ﬁnancing
The next metric of firm performance that we investigated was the ability of the firm to obtain late-stage
financing. The VentureXpert database includes a categorization of the type of financing represented by
each round of financing. The Venture Capital Yearbook
includes a description of those categories that divides
them into early, expansion, and late stage financing.
Generally, early stage financing supports product development, market research, and the development of a
business plan. Expansion financing involves working
capital for a firm that has begun to produce and ship products. Later stage financing primarily involves firms with
positive cash flow and a stabilized growth rate. Fig. 4
shows how the latest stage of financing that each firm
obtained falls within that categorization.
Assuming that a firm that develops far enough to
obtain late-stage financing is a better investment than a
firm that does not ever develop to that stage, we analyzed

Fig. 4. Latest stage of financing.

3.3.5. Longevity and patenting
The last variable that we examined was longevity. In
some contexts, longevity alone might not be characterized as success. Consider a public firm, for example,
with earnings growth and a return on investment that
are both lower than those for other firms in the same
industry. In the context of a venture-backed firm, however, longevity alone is a reasonable indicator of success,
because it generally suggests that the firm is making sufficient progress to avoid being liquidated by its venture
capital investors.13
Unfortunately, longevity is not an easy variable to
analyze directly because it is difficult to measure either
the beginning or end of these firms. For the beginning
point, we can use the date of the first venture capital
financing as a reasonable proxy that at least measures a
similar point in the life cycle of each firm. The end point
is much more difficult, given the lack of data for when
the firm fails. Ultimately, we decided to assign a number
13

For details on that process, see Mann (2005b).
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Table 10
Patenting and longevity
Independent variable

P-Value (regr.)

Expl. power (regr.) (%)

Coeff. (days/unit)

Number of patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

0.0013
0.0054
0.0190
0.2431

1.1834
0.8830
0.6275
0.1557

45
179
193
n/a

py

The dependent variable is the days of longevity, as defined in the text.

even controlling for longevity. Conversely, when we control for longevity, having a patent before first financing
is not significantly related to any of the performance
variables. The analysis of status (not reported here) is
consistent with that result, though less definitive, largely
because of the interaction of the large number of different values for longevity and the relatively small number
of firms in some of the exit status categories.
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3.4. Controlling for industry group
The previous sections reported strongly significant
relations between patenting and industry group and
between patenting and each of the five variables we use
as proxies for progress of the portfolio firm. It is therefore
possible that industry group could explain the relationships between patenting and the various performance
proxies. Accordingly, we undertook to control for industry group in the analysis of those five variables. In each
case, the proxies for success retained their significance.
The analysis for rounds, total investment, and
longevity was relatively straightforward, because those
are numerical variables. We used a two-way analysis
of variance with both industry group and patent status
as independent variables and the various performance
proxies as dependent variables. Table 11 summarizes the
results of that analysis.
The analysis for the remaining variables (late stage
financing and exit status) is more challenging, because
they are categorical variables. Because of the number
of industry groups, the firm counts in many of the cells
are quite sparse when the data are separated into industry groups for the various financing and status categories.
One possibility would be to combine some of the smaller
industry groups into larger ones. We have resisted that
approach, both because of the likelihood that any combination would be indefensibly subjective, and because
we wished to attempt to locate the particular sectors in
which significant differences appear.
Recognizing those difficulties, our approach has been
to run a χ2 analysis for each separate industry group,
for both of the categorical variables, identifying the par-
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• Existing: months from first financing to 1 January
2005.
• Unknown or defunct: months from first financing to 6
months after last financing.
• Acquired: months from first financing to the later of
last financing or acquisition date.
• IPO: months from first financing to 1 January 2005.
This assumes that all IPO firms were alive as of 1
January 2005, which might be wrong, but it is a better
assumption than assuming that all IPO firms died on
their IPO date.

co

of days to the various VentureXpert status categories, as
indicated below, resting on the assumption that no firm
is likely to fail within 6 months of getting financing.
Although the numbers will not be perfect, we thought
that they would put firms in a plausible series based on
longevity:
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Using that classification system, we used the patenting variables as independent variables and longevity (in
days) as the dependent variable. The findings show correlations with strong significance, summarized in Table 10.
The coefficients suggest that an increase of one in the
total number of patents is related to an increase of 45
days in firm longevity, and that firms with patents survive
179 days longer than firms without patents. We do not
report biotech data that found no significant correlations
based on longevity.
An obvious concern with the results reported thus far
is the possibility that the relationships between patenting and firm performance are attributable entirely to
longevity: firms simply get more patents as times goes
by, without regard to any other indicators of success.
To investigate that question, we conducted a series of
analyses to control for longevity.
Those analyses suggest that longevity alone does not
explain the findings that we discuss above. Specifically,
they indicate that each of the three post-financing patenting variables (number of patents, having a patent, and
having multiple patents) is significantly related to number of rounds, total investment, and late-stage financing,
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Table 11
Patents and rounds, total investment, longevity (controlling for industry group)
P-Value (regr.)

Expl. power (regr.)

Coeff. (rounds/unit)

Rounds
Number of patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0008
0.9021

4.02
4.41
3.44
2.16

0.14
0.73
0.70
n/a

py

Independent variable

P-Value (regr.)

Expl. power (regr.)

Coeff. ($M/unit)

Total investment
Number of patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.23

4.28
3.48
3.34
1.62

2.7
10.6
13.0
n/a

Independent variable

P-Value (regr.)

Expl. power (regr.)

Coeff. (days/unit)

Longevity
Number of patents
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)
Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

0.0013
0.0048
0.021
0.24

2.28
2.02
1.72
1.27

45
183
191
n/a

The dependent variable is the number of rounds of financing.

rs

Table 12
Patents and exit status, financing stage (controlling for industry group)
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Independent variable

CMH P-value

Significant sectors

Source of significance

Financing stage
Patents/no patents (0–1)
Multiple patents (0–1)

<0.0001
0.0008

(Applications)***
(Applications)*
Internet**
n/a

Stage zero
Stage zero
Stage one

Comm/Networking*
(Applications)***
Internet**
Systems*
Comm/Networking*
(Applications)*
Internet*
Comm/Networking*

(Defunct)
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Acquisition

pe

Independent variable

Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

0.21

Final status
Patents/no patents (0–1)

r's

<0.0001

<0.0001

th
o

Multiple patents (0–1)

Patent issued before round 1 (0–1)

0.0133

Au

CMH: Cochrane–Mantel–Haentzel χ2 -test. Parentheses in Table 12 indicate sectors and statuses with substantially lower than expected levels of
the applicable patenting variable. Generally, the applications sector and defunct status have abnormally low patenting rates and the other identified
sectors (Internet, Systems, Comm/Networking) and the public status have abnormally high patenting rates.

ticular groups in which there appear to be significant
relations. We then calculate an overall assessment for
the significance of the relation, controlling for industry
group (a Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel test).14 Although
that form of analysis can produce considerable ambiguity in situations in which the Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel

14

For detailed explanation of that test, see Agresti (2002).

test indicates a relation that is not apparent in any particular category, or in cases in which individual categories
indicate relations but the Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel test
does not, those problems do not afflict our data. For all of
the relations that we test here, either both tests indicated a
significant relation (the result for all of the post-financing
patenting variables) or neither test did (the result for the
pre-financing patenting variable). Table 12 summarizes
the results of that analysis.
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The data presented in Section 3 are limited in a
number of ways. For one thing, the dataset includes a
narrow slice of the software industry: young firms that
received their first round of venture financing during
a relatively short period preceding the market crash in
2001. As explained in Mann 2005a, patents play a very
different role in mature firms. Moreover, there is good
reason to believe that the commercialization strategies
of startup firms that are not venture-backed might differ
significantly (Hsu, 2004; Hsu, 2006). Thus, for example, patents might be less important for firms that are not
venture-backed because those firms are less likely to pursue cooperative commercialization strategies. Finally,
we are unable to disentangle causation issues with this
dataset; thus, despite the relationships between firm performance and patenting, we are left with the possibilities
that funding might facilitate patenting or that the potential for patenting might be a precursor of the success that
justifies continued funding.
We also emphasize that our data do not address
the ultimate welfare question, whether patents provide
a social benefit to the industry as a whole. Our data
do suggest that patents are valuable for the firms that
elect to obtain them, but this data does not exclude
the possibility (frequently discussed in the existing
literature) that the transaction costs those patents impose
on third parties exceed the value they provide to the
firms that obtain them.
Subject to those qualifications, we believe that our
data illuminate several issues about the role of patents
in the development of successful firms in the software
industry.

patents already have acquired some patents at this early
stage.
The heterogeneity of the software industry contributes to an understanding of the data. As the interviews
discussed in Mann (2005a) explain, the industry includes
many sectors in which patents have considerable importance and many sectors in which patents have little
value. Indeed, the data show a significant correlation
between patent acquisition and the sector in which the
firm operates. Although the idiosyncratic sector designations in our dataset make it difficult to test the
intuition statistically, the distinction between products
firms and services firms (Cusumano, 2004) seems to be
of great importance.15 In sectors dominated by products firms, patents might be useful to prevent competitors
from developing products that offer similar functionality. By contrast, in sectors dominated by services firms,
distinguished by the care and responsiveness of their
employees, patents often would have relatively little
value.
Given our focus on the role of patenting, it is notable
that the great majority of venture-backed software firms
are closer to the product end of the product/service continuum. It would be an exaggeration to say that there
are no venture-backed software services firms: there certainly are quite a few (as Cusumano discusses). We do
believe, however, that the products firms, which are the
firms for which patents tend to be more useful, are much
more common in our dataset. Only 48 of our 877 firms
(5%) were listed with a primary industry code indicating that their primary business was in a software services
sector (VEIC sectors 2760–2769). Thus, in this dataset,
the variation in patenting is for the most part a variation
in the usefulness of patents to different types of products
firms.
Roughly speaking, we can speculate that the data
reflect a distinction between sales to individuals and
business users on the one hand (products that manage
data, customer relationships, employees, and the like)
and sales to designers/developers of software (development and graphics tools, server software, firmware,
security, etc.), on the other. Generally, our intuition is
that patents matter more in the latter group of sectors,
where the innovation is in the design and functionality,
rather than execution. If this analysis is correct, it would
explain, for example, the results in Table 12 that indicate
a persistently and significantly low level of patenting for
the applications sector, which would fall within the first
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4. Analysis
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4.1. Patenting rates
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The most obvious point is that the rate of patenting – even in this subset of venture-backed firms –
is quite low: only 24% of the 877 software firms had
patents. The patenting rate for the software industry
is much lower than the comparable rate for biotech
firms, even though biotech firms are more likely than
software firms to rely on patented technology licensed
from third parties. The low patenting rate cannot be
explained by the fact that we are examining firms at an
early stage of their life cycle. A dataset that one of us
has collected in related research indicates that patents
were held by only 30% of the 1100 firms that have
at any time in the last 5 years been in the Software
500 (an index of the nation’s largest software firms).
Thus, it appears that most software firms that obtain

15 One of us is testing that hypothesis with a dataset of patents held
by the 500 largest software firms.
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cally an entrepreneurial startup struggling to survive long
enough to bring its product to market.
One important qualification relates to the question
whether venture capitalists are acting rationally in their
apparent attention to patenting practices in their investment decisions. As discussed above, we can see why
venture capitalists would tend to prefer the kinds of firms
for which patents would be valuable: products firms are
likely to be characterized by high margins and easy scalability. The fact that more of those firms have patents
does not necessarily say anything about the distinctive
management acumen of the particular firm. Rather, it
might simply indicate that all well-managed firms get
the appropriate number of patents for their technology
and that the appropriate number depends substantially
on the nature of the firm’s business model. Still, the data
about successful exit strongly suggest that reliance on
firms with a patenting model would be rational: Table 4
indicates that 13% of the firms with patents went public by 2005, while only 3% of those without patents did
(22% and 5%, respectively of the biotech firms).
4.3. Patenting and development stage
The last major point is the timing question: when firms
get patents. Patents are likely to have their greatest value
for firms at the later stage of our dataset: when they have
started to generate revenues (that patents might protect),
but before they have obtained the market identification
that might decrease the need for them to rely on patents
to support their market share (Mann, 2005a). The data
that we present here support that understanding of the
dynamic value of patents in two different ways. First,
the data suggest that there is little significance to having
a patent before first financing.16 Specifically, there was
no indication that the existence of patents or applications
before first financing had a positive impact on most of
the performance variables. The only relation was with
exit status, and that one was (by comparison to the other
relations apparent in our data) not strongly significant.
Second, most of the firms that obtain patents do so
at a relatively early stage after the first venture-backed
financing. On that point, recall that 24% of this population of very young firms already has patents in an
industry in which less than one-third of the most sub-
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group discussed above. Of course, IP still may be important in the first group of sectors, but copyright law may
provide adequate protection for those products, particularly in areas where the visual aspects of the interface
are important to product differentiation (Mann, 2005a).
Similarly, there may be a distinction based on the
nature of the customers: firms that rely on a long-term
contract with a large customer may depend less on
IP, while those that use a large set of short-term contracts with smaller consumers or vendors might worry
more about efforts to appropriate the functionality and
compete against the original designer. It is difficult to
generalize on this subject because the appropriability of
patents in the industry is so weak that firms leverage their
technology through countless other mechanisms such as
strategic partnerships, distribution channels, and the like
(Mann, 2005a).
Another notable point is the relatively small number
of patents held by the firms that do acquire patents: an
average of three in the software industry compared to an
average of almost 10 in the biotech industry. One way
to understand the data is that the existence of patents is
much more important to a firm’s success than the number of patents that it has, and that the number of patents
depends on the nature of the technology. We draw some
tentative support for that point from the consistency with
which our data illustrated that the performance variables had a more significant relation to the patent/no
patent variable than to the number-of-patents variable.
That perspective is at least in tension with the notion
that substantial benefits come directly from possession
of large patent portfolios. Rather, it suggests, the number of patents that a firm obtains is more likely to be
a function of the nature of the innovations of the firm.
That might be particularly true for smaller firms still at
the venture-backed stage. If those firms are not likely to
be sued, and cannot yet exploit their patents (see Mann,
2005a), there is some reason to think that large patent
portfolios will have relatively little value for those firms.
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4.2. Patents and performance

The most important question for us is the one at the
heart of the paper: the relation between patents and the
progress of firms through the venture capital cycle. As
reported above, there are strongly significant correlations between variables of patenting, on the one hand,
and various proxies for strong performance: rounds of
financing, total investment, exit status, reaching a late
stage of financing, and longevity. In our view, these variables collectively include most of the characteristics that
would count as “success” for a venture-backed firm: typi-

16 Mann (2005a) explains that many investors place little or no weight
on the existence of patents in their initial investment decision. That finding also is consistent with the data reported in Hsu (2004) (analyzing a
dataset of venture-backed and SBIC startups in various industries and
finding no relation between pre-funding patents and various measures
of firm performance).

R.J. Mann, T.W. Sager / Research Policy 36 (2007) 193–208

Au

th
o

r's

co

pe

rs

on

al

5. Conclusion
The question of whether patents actually foster innovation is an intractable one that cannot easily be resolved
by empirical evidence, primarily because it is impossible to provide comparable datasets in which the same
opportunities for innovation are available to firms with
and without the incentives and constraints provided by
a system of intellectual property. To be sure, historical
data on such questions strongly suggest that intellectual
property has a significant effect on the direction of innovation (Moser, 2005). Even that work, however, cannot
say anything about the net effect on innovation.
Thus, the goals of this paper are more modest, to
investigate for one particular industry the quantitative
relation between patenting, receipt of early stage venture
financing, and progression through the venture capital cycle. Although our data are ambiguous in some
respects, they do provide considerable information about
the role of patents in software startups. Most obviously,
the irrelevance of pre-financing patents is consistent with
the argument that for the great majority of venturebacked startups the possibility of patenting is quite low
on the list of investment criteria. More broadly, the correlations between patenting and performance proxies are
consistent with the view that the ability of firms to use
patents to appropriate the value of innovation is at once
crucially important for some firms and at the same time
markedly different from firm to firm, even within the
industry. Generally, those correlations suggest that the
decision to patent is a routine one, not a strategic one, and
that startup firms for which patents are useful will obtain
patents in due course, if the firm survives long enough for
the patents to become valuable. Many firms, for which
patents are not useful, will never obtain patents, without
regard to their initial financing arrangements and sub-

sequent performance: 42% of the venture-backed firms
that went public in our dataset do not yet have patents.
Finally, the analysis has implications for more recent
developments in patent scholarship that focus on the
potentially deleterious effects of the patent accumulations by mature industry incumbents. Even if those
accumulations are deleterious to many of those firms,
the analysis here suggests two important countervailing
effects. The first is the possibility that patents support
young firms in their efforts to compete, thus helping
to stabilize the relatively decentralized structure of the
industry and forestall movement toward greater concentration and the market power that goes with it. Even if we
cannot disentangle the causal relation between patents
and successful investments, the fact that patents are correlated so robustly with successful investments suggests
that a software venture-investment cycle without patents
would be different from the one we have now.
The second is the possibility that patents facilitate the
intra-industry technology transfers upon which innovation depends in a realm of cumulative innovation. The
work of Ashish Arora in particular has provided a strong
theoretical basis for that understanding, rooted in the
notion that the availability of patents will facilitate the
entry of smaller firms contributing technology to products assembled by larger firms (Arora and Merges, 2004).
If the optimal structure for complex cumulative innovation is a structure in which a relatively large group of
small firms develops components that are integrated into
products or used in the delivery of services provided
by larger firms, then the ability of patents to foster that
structure is an important benefit.
In the end, the point of this paper is that a serious
debate about the propriety of patents in the software
industry must account not only for the possibility that
patents might impose substantial costs, but also for the
possibility that they provide substantial benefits. Our
paper contributes to the existing literature by providing a quantitative link between patenting behavior and
firm success. Our work provides substantial evidence
that patenting, at least in this industry, is an important part of a well-organized operation, rather than a
random or happenstance occurrence. Further, the paper
is important simply for shedding light on the operations of patents in an industry in which they are highly
controversial. Although we cannot answer the ultimate
welfare question – would the industry be better without patents than it is with patents – we do shed a great
deal of light on the reasons why so many firms do –
and do not – choose to expend the time and resources
necessary to obtain patents to protect their innovative
work.

py

stantial mature firms have patents. That finding suggests
that firms in this industry take steps to protect their IP
early in their life cycle, long before the patents are likely
to be useful for offensive purposes.
We note one additional possibility suggested by the
data, that portfolio firms obtain the patents not because
they increase the value of the firm to its investors, but
because they protect the contributions of the firm from
expropriation by the investors. The idea here is that by
giving the portfolio firm a cognizable property right in its
technology, the patents increase the value of the firm by
decreasing the costs of moral hazard and hold-up in the
relations between the entrepreneurs and their investors.
Shane (2002) proposes a similar mechanism to explain
patterns in licensing of patents assigned to MIT.
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